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 1 
ADOLESCENTS IN SOCIETY: THEIR 
EVOLVING LEGAL STATUS  
INTRODUCTION 
Cynthia Godsoe 
The last few years have brought particularly significant 
transformations in the interplay between society and adolescents. 
On the one hand, the law is increasingly recognizing the key 
neurological and psychosocial differences between adults and 
adolescents. As the Supreme Court has concluded in a string of 
recent cases: there are certain “self-evident” and “universal” 
differences between children and adults confirmed by both 
science and common sense.1 On the other hand, young people 
are increasingly asserting their independence, whether through 
the use of new technologies or in medical decisions, and are 
demanding a voice in matters that concern them.2 
                                                          
 Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A. 
Harvard University. I would like to thank Aliza Kaplan, Karen Porter, and 
Jayne Ressler for their helpful comments, as well as Sam Chetrit for her 
excellent research assistance. Lastly, I want to thank the Journal of Law and 
Policy staff for its very able editing.   
1 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403–04 (2011) 
(referencing the long common law history of differentiating between minors 
and adults); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) 
(confirming differences between juveniles and adults in finding life without 
parole to be an unconstitutional punishment for juveniles charged with non-
homicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–73 (2005) (finding 
the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles based upon their immaturity 
and differences from adults including greater vulnerability to peer pressure). 
For an earlier recognition of this truth, see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 
635 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“[Youth] often lack the experience, 
perspective, and judgment to [make the right choices].”).  
2 See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Black? White? Asian? More Young Americans 
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An initial question is: What exactly is an adolescent? 
Definitions vary but are uniformly vague: Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines “adolescence” as “[t]hat age 
which follows puberty and precedes the age of majority.”3 Other 
definitions are similarly unhelpful: “Of, relating to, or 
undergoing adolescence (i.e. . . . 1. The period of physical and 
psychological development from the onset of puberty to 
maturity. 2. A transitional period of development between youth 
and maturity: the adolescence of a nation)”;4 or, “a young 
person who is developing from a child into an adult e.g. 
adolescents between the ages of 13 and 18 and the problems 
they face.”5 The term adolescent is often used synonymously 
with teenager, but arguably also includes those aged ten to 
twelve, or “tweens,” and those aged eighteen to twenty-one, the 
latter being adults for some purposes.6 The definition depends 
upon whether one is using the term to refer to cultural, 
physiological, or neurological maturity. Cultural maturity—
engaging in typically adolescent behaviors such as seeking 
independence from parents and prioritizing socializing with 
                                                          
Choose All of the Above, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at A1 (outlining how 
young people are refusing to be defined along color lines or to submit to the 
racial classifications drawn by prior generations); Joey Peters, Young Climate 
Activists Push Obama, Vow to Create More Local Awareness, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/04/18/18climatewire- 
young-climate-activists-push-obama-vow-to-cr-82293.html (discussing the 
leadership of young people in revitalizing grassroots movements). 
3 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 49 (6th ed. 1990).  
4 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 23 
(4th ed. 2000). 
5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 170 (2d ed. 1989). 
6 See, e.g., Act of July 17, 1984, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (treating 
persons under age twenty-one as adolescents for the purpose of consuming 
alcohol); Preteens and Teens Still Need Vaccines, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/who/teens/ (last 
updated Aug. 25, 2011) (grouping teens and tweens in the “adolescents” 
category for vaccine scheduling). Neurological and psychosocial research 
indicates that impulse control and other brain functions are not fully mature 
until the mid-twenties. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong 
Direction: Science, Teenagers, and the Sting to “the Age of Consent,” 20 
J.L. & POL’Y 63 (2011) (outlining this research). 
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peers7—and physiological maturity are beginning to occur 
younger, whereas the latest research shows that neurological 
maturity may not be complete until the mid-twenties.8 Under any 
definition, adolescents comprise a significant number of 
Americans: as of 2010, there were 40,979,000 ten- to nineteen-
year-olds (and 21,154,000 more twenty- to twenty-four-year-
olds), comprising 13.5 to 20.5 percent of the population.9 
Over the last half-century, adolescents have increasingly been 
seen as a unique demographic group with their own culture, 
strengths, and needs.10 Yet the law recognizes only two categories: 
childhood and adulthood.11 And with a foot in each class, 
adolescents have claims to be both excused from and held 
responsible for their actions. The law has responded to this 
confusion by being, in a word, confusing. The legal status of 
adolescents has been variable and often inconsistent; adolescents 
are treated as mature adults for some purposes and as incompetent 
minors for others.12 This area of law has never been more in flux.13 
                                                          
7 These examples are manifestations of cultural maturity in American 
society. As the name suggests, signifiers of cultural maturity will vary 
according to societal norms. 
8 Although cultural maturity begins earlier, it also continues later, with 
more young people in their mid-twenties remaining financially dependent on 
their parents, often even living in their childhood homes. See, e.g., Jennifer 
Rosato, Essay, What Are the Implications of Roper’s Dilemma for Adolescent 
Health Law?, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 167 (2011) (discussing this trend). 
9 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, ANNUAL 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT TABLE 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/age/age_sex_2010.html. In 
fact, the variable definitions of adolescence and the failure of researchers to 
collect data based on an exclusive definition of adolescence complicate 
discussion of this population. See Jonathan Todres, Beyond the Bedside: A 
Human Rights Approach to Adolescent Health, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 191 (2011). 
10 It is important to note that adolescents are also incredibly diverse, with 
large differences based on race, class and other characteristics. 
11 The Supreme Court, however, did appear to recognize the difference 
between children and adolescents in the recent J.D.B. opinion. J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2407 (2011) (pointing out that a police 
officer or judge need only have “the common sense to know that a 7-year-old 
is not a 13-year-old [i.e. an adolescent] and neither is an adult”). 
12 New York, for instance, has a wide range of different minimum ages 
for purchasing and drinking alcohol, voting, driving and obtaining 
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The symposium “Adolescents in Society: Their Evolving 
Legal Status,” which took place in March 2011, focused on 
three key areas: criminal law, health, and technology. We were 
extremely fortunate to be able to bring together judges, lawyers, 
scholars, and other experts to address questions including: How 
has the status and role of adolescents changed recently, whether 
through court decisions, legislation or other means of social 
change?; What types of data or evidence, be it psychological, 
statistical, or anecdotal, are courts and legislatures relying on to 
craft protections and obligations for today’s youth?; How should 
young people be accorded increasing autonomy to allow them to 
mature, while also being protected against harms to which they 
are vulnerable?  
JUVENILE JUSTICE 
Michael Corriero, founder and director of the New York 
Center for Juvenile Justice (NYCJJ) and former judge, kicked 
off the symposium. Calling upon the audience to remember the 
key differences between youth and adults, and the original 
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court, Judge Corriero 
called for a system which “judges children as children,” while 
                                                          
contraception. See N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1 (setting the voting age at 
eighteen); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 2000) (prohibiting 
the sale of alcohol to people under twenty-one); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH 
LAW § 2504 (McKinney 2002); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 502(2)(d) 
(McKinney 1996) (allowing driving in some instances at age sixteen); N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.6(a) (2011) (allowing minors sixteen 
or older to access contraception without parental permission and allowing 
facility staff to provide contraception to minors under sixteen years at their 
discretion, encouraging consultation with a parent or guardian); see also 
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MINORS’ ACCESS TO 
CONTRACEPTIVE SERVICES (2011). 
13 Even the Supreme Court, while affirming the difference between 
children and adults in J.D.B., acknowledged that some adolescents may be 
closer to adults than to children and may therefore merit treatment more as 
an adult than a child. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406 (acknowledging that a 
young person’s age will not be a major factor in some cases, and that an 
older teenager will often react to a police interrogation in the same way as a 
young adult or eighteen-year-old).  
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still retaining the power to deal effectively with the few youth 
who remain violent and dangerous. To illustrate his point, he 
told the story of Qing Hong Wu. In 1996, Judge Corriero 
sentenced a fifteen-year-old Wu for a string of robberies. The 
Judge urged Wu to use his time in a juvenile facility to turn his 
life around.14 The young man did just that: he was a model 
inmate and, upon his release, finished school and embarked on a 
successful career in technology, supporting his immigrant 
mother. Yet almost fifteen years later, Wu was about to be 
deported to China based on his juvenile crime. Judge Corriero 
successfully petitioned Governor Paterson to pardon Wu’s 
crimes so that he could stay in America. Despite this success, 
Judge Corriero lamented the inflexibility of laws governing the 
juvenile justice system that do not let most young people have a 
second chance.15  
A panel of experts, including Tamar Birckhead, Mark 
Fondacaro, Jeffrey Fagan, and Hillary Farber, then considered 
other issues related to juvenile justice. They considered a central 
ongoing debate—how society should address youth accused of 
crimes. Should these crimes be adjudicated in a specialized 
rehabilitative court for juveniles, or in the standard retributive 
system with most of the due process protections accorded to 
adults?16 Those arguing for the former cite the special 
characteristics and needs of youth and the harshness of the adult 
system, regardless of due process protections.17 Those arguing 
for the latter fear the potential for overreaching by even well-
meaning judges under a “rehabilitative” system, and point to the 
                                                          
14 For a full description of this case, see Nina Bernstein, Judge Keeps 
Word to Immigrant Who Kept His, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at A1.  
15 New York State’s chief judge, Jonathan Lippman, recently called for a 
raised age of criminal liability in the state, so that sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds would no longer be routinely tried as adults. See Mosi Secret, 
Judge Seeks New System for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at A22. 
16 See Tamar R. Birckhead, Juvenile Justice Reform 2.0, 20 J.L. & 
POL’Y 15 (2011) (for a concise yet informative outline of the original juvenile 
court model). 
17 See, e.g., John Mahoney, DW’s Cautionary Tale, 37 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 769, 775–76 (2011); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence 
Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 
FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2008, at 15, 15.  
6 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Supreme Court’s recognition, in the seminal case of In re Gault, 
of the need for due process.18 Regardless of which system we 
select as the most fair and effective, questions remain about how 
best to achieve structural change and influence the actions of all 
of the players involved: police, youth, judges, parents and 
lawyers. Finally, there are empirical and practical concerns to 
consider. What interventions and programs have been shown to 
work best to rehabilitate or otherwise address the complex 
causes of youth delinquent and criminal behavior, and how 
should we best allocate scarce resources?  
Rather than simply weigh in on the retributive or 
rehabilitative side of the debate, Professors Tamar Birckhead 
and Mark Fondacaro forge new approaches to these complex 
problems in their symposium pieces. In Juvenile Justice Reform 
2.0, Professor Birckhead argues for a more nuanced approach to 
institutional change.19 She illustrates how the seminal case of In 
re Gault, which extended due process protections to juvenile 
offenders, did not result in changes advocates had hoped for. 
She posits that this is due to the lack of incentives for reform or 
substantive external oversight of the insular juvenile court 
world. As a result, many of the practices and policies of local 
courts, officials, and state legislatures remained relatively intact, 
and the forty years since Gault have seen an increase in the 
punitive nature of sanctions accorded juveniles, high recidivism 
rates, and disproportionate minority representation. Nonetheless, 
Professor Birckhead is cautiously optimistic that the recent 
decisions in Roper v. Simmons,20 Graham v. Florida,21 and 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina22 may have a more profound impact on 
                                                          
18 See, e.g., Barry Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, 
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997) (for the view that the juvenile justice system should 
adapt the process to the special needs and characteristics of the adolescent 
population by allowing for their meaningful participation); see also Emily 
Buss, Failing Juvenile Courts, and What Lawyers and Judges Can Do About 
It, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318 (2011). 
19 Birckhead, supra note 16. 
20 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
21 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
22 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 Adolescents in Society: Introduction 7 
the juvenile justice system due to their narrow and specific 
holdings and significant incentives to change the juvenile justice 
system to reduce recidivism rates and increase fiscal savings. 
These changes could range from the acknowledgment of youth 
as a mitigating, rather than aggravating, factor to the increased 
use of community-based rehabilitation programs. Yet Professor 
Birckhead concludes that “constitutional litigation is an 
unreliable path to social change” and it therefore must be 
accompanied by work with community-based organizations that 
include all the system’s constituencies to achieve truly lasting 
reform. 
In The Injustice of Retribution: Toward a Multisystemic Risk 
Management Model of Juvenile Justice, Professor Mark 
Fondacaro also begins by acknowledging the failure of the 
current system to address juvenile crime effectively or treat 
juveniles fairly.23 As an alternative, Professor Fondacaro posits a 
new model to deal with young offenders. Drawing on both 
psychology and law, Professor Fondacaro proposes a forward-
looking, multisystemic model to understand and influence 
juveniles’ behavior.24 He argues that the traditional retributive 
model of criminal justice draws upon antiquated and unsupported 
“folk psychology” concepts of human behavior. In its stead, 
Professor Fondacaro proposes a more pragmatic system that 
would contextualize the young person, by involving his or her 
parents, community, and service providers from multiple 
disciplines, and empirically assess risk and protective factors 
rather than adjudicate “moral” guilt. Such a system would rely 
on evidence-based interventions to treat behaviors and reduce 
recidivism. This model appears to be particularly suited to 
adolescents given the recognition that they are more susceptible 
than adults to outside influences, particularly their peers, and are 
also more capable of rehabilitation.25 Departing from a more due 
                                                          
23 Mark R. Fondacaro, The Injustice of Retribution: Toward a 
Multisystemic Risk Management Model of Juvenile Justice, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 
145 (2011). 
24 See Professor Fondacaro’s recent book, MARK FONDACARO & 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE 
JUSTICE, 63–121 (2011), for further discussion of this model. 
25 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (drawing these conclusions about 
8 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
process-oriented model for youth, Professor Fondacaro cites the 
lower level of process accorded juveniles26 as an opportunity to 
test this more pragmatic and efficient, yet fair, administrative 
justice approach.  
The most frequent interaction that adolescents have with the 
juvenile justice system is with the police. Two panelists 
considered how police should and do interact with young people. 
Professor Jeffrey Fagan offered initial findings of his empirical 
research on police stops of young people in several high-crime 
neighborhoods of New York City. He focused on random or 
preventive stops, most of which did not result in the discovery 
of criminal activity or in an arrest. During such encounters, 
police often treat adolescents in a derogatory and even 
discriminatory fashion. Adolescents are left with an arguably 
justifiable distrust of, or hostility towards, the police and other 
state actors, just as they are developing civic maturity. These 
police practices persist, in part, because stops of young people 
are rarely recorded and largely fall below the public “radar.”27 
The recent J.D.B. decision requires police officers to be 
more proactive in offering Miranda warnings to youthful 
suspects, since the court determined that age is a factor to be 
considered in the analysis of whether or not someone is in police 
custody.28 Yet the decision may have an even broader impact on 
police interaction with juveniles. J.D.B. and its predecessor 
cases, Graham and Simmons, may serve a signaling function that 
the treatment of adolescents can no longer be covertly abusive, 
and that interactions with them must take into account their 
unique capabilities and vulnerabilities. In J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina: Ushering in a New “Age” of Custody Analysis under 
Miranda, Professor Hillary Farber considers the potential impact 
of the J.D.B. decision on police interactions with young people, 
                                                          
young people). 
26 For instance, juveniles accused of criminal behavior, unlike adults, are 
not entitled to a jury trial.  
27 Videotape: Adolescents in Society: Their Evolving Legal Status 
(Brooklyn Law School 2011) (available at http://www.totalwebcasting.com/ 
view/?func=VIDI&id=bls&date=2011-03-18&seq=1&mt=2&ext=1) 
[hereinafter Videotape: Adolescents in Society]. 
28 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011). 
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including Terry stops, as well as on other instances where young 
people interact with adults in the legal system, such as the 
attorney-client relationship and any waiver of a juvenile’s right 
to counsel.29 While adolescents may distrust these authority 
figures, they are nonetheless more deferential to them than are 
other adults. Justice Kennedy noted this tendency in Graham v. 
Florida, implying that this deference has consequences for due 
process. Professor Farber concludes that the recognition of 
adolescents as “categorically distinct from adults” in J.D.B. and 
related cases could lead to meaningful due process for children, 
according rights and protections commensurate with their 
development. In this way, the spirit of Gault may be 
“reinvigorate[d].” 
TECHNOLOGY 
The increasing interaction of young people with technology 
raises numerous difficult questions. For instance, what policies 
or legal tools should be used to address adolescents who “sext,” 
(send sexually explicit messages or photographs via their cell 
phones)? Should the sale of violent video games be banned or at 
least require parental controls? Our experts on the technology 
panel addressed these and other issues. Chris Hansen, Senior 
National Counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union 
discussed the First Amendment rights of adolescents, arguing 
that the recent use of child pornography laws to criminally 
prosecute minors for sexting is both ineffective policy and a 
violation of the right to free speech. Professor John Humbach 
from Pace Law School addressed a minor’s First Amendment 
right to access certain material. Addressing a case recently 
before the Supreme Court, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association, Professor Humbach outlined some of the points for 
and against curtailing young people’s access to these materials.30 
                                                          
29 Hillary B. Farber, JDB v. North Carolina: Ushering In a New “Age” 
of Custody Analysis Under Miranda, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 117 (2011). 
30 The opinion came out after the symposium. See Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). The 5-4 majority struck down the 
California statute at issue, which prohibited the sale or rental of violent video 
games to minors.  
10 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Amanda Lenhart, from the Pew Research Center’s Internet and 
American Life Project outlined some of the data on adolescents 
and technology: Between nine and thirty-three percent of 
adolescents aged ten to eighteen have been cyberbullied or 
harassed online; four percent of teens owning cell phones have 
sent a sexually suggestive photo or video of themselves to 
someone else; and fifteen percent have received one.31 Although 
we are still struggling to achieve the appropriate balance 
between protection and autonomy for adolescents in this realm, 
it is clear that we cannot ignore the increasingly important role 
of technology in their lives. 
HEALTH CARE 
Whether and how to address the differences between adults 
and adolescents has also long been debated in the health care 
realm.32 Young people have historically been treated very 
differently in the criminal justice and health arenas. In the 
former, adolescents have often been held to adult levels of 
responsibility. In contrast, adolescents have typically been 
excluded from medical decision making beyond narrow 
exceptions, such as reproductive health or substance abuse 
treatment, or when their parents are denying them lifesaving 
treatment.33 In such instances, “mature” minors may be allowed 
to make decisions about their own bodies, whereas those 
considered not yet mature will have their parents or other adults 
appointed by the court to do so.34  
The recent recognition of the neurological and psychosocial 
differences between adolescents and adults in the criminal 
context raises questions about the determination of consent in the 
health care arena as well. Panelists Jonathan Todres, Jennifer 
Rosato, Jennifer Drobac, and Abigail English discussed whether 
or not maturity means the same thing in various contexts, such 
as the criminal versus health care arenas. The panelists also 
                                                          
31 Videotape: Adolescents in Society, supra note 27. 
32 See, e.g., Belotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
33 See, e.g., Rosato, supra note 8, 173–179 (outlining cases). 
34 Id. 
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discussed how to define adolescent health. Is the current 
framework overly focused on political hot topics, such as 
minors’ access to contraceptives and abortions, rather than also 
incorporating other public health problems that impact many 
young people, such as violence, nutrition and sexual 
exploitation? In addition to discussing how the new science 
should be incorporated into determinations of capacity, panelists 
also considered what meaningful consent and participation in 
medical decision making should entail for young people. 
Drawing the proper balance between protection and autonomy is 
particularly difficult in this field where the consequences of bad 
choices can be so detrimental.  
Since our discussions about adolescent health tend to 
myopically focus on abortion and other reproductive health 
issues, in Beyond the Bedside: A Human Rights Approach to 
Adolescent Health, Professor Jonathan Todres seeks to expand 
the dialogue by addressing other key issues which have a great 
impact on adolescents’ health: violence, substance use and 
obesity. Professor Todres outlines the harms resulting from 
these health problems, which continue from adolescence into 
adulthood.35 For instance, over half of urban adolescents have 
witnessed or been victimized by violence; three quarters of 
adolescents have tried alcohol and about half have smoked 
cigarettes; and eighteen percent of American adolescents are 
obese, with many more overweight. These “systemic 
community” public health issues, Professor Todres argues, are 
best addressed through a human rights framework. Such an 
approach looks at adolescents and their communities holistically. 
It also gives a voice to the youth themselves, by incorporating 
their participation at every stage of health care assessment and 
delivery.  
Two experts address the thorny dilemma of adolescent 
capacity and consent: When is a young person adequately 
mature to consent to medical treatment or sexual activity? Who 
should determine such maturity and how? In What are the 
Implications of Roper’s Dilemma for Adolescent Health Law?, 
Dean Jennifer Rosato considers how recent scientific findings 
                                                          
35 Todres, supra note 9. 
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illustrating the differences between adolescents and adults, 
findings the Supreme Court has found persuasive, will affect 
health care decision making. Dean Rosato admits to being “a bit 
troubled” by Roper, Graham, and other recent decisions finding 
juveniles less culpable in criminal matters, since the same logic 
may be applied to deny young people a voice and consent 
powers in health matters.36 She is also sensitive to the 
accusation, made by Justice Scalia in the Roper dissent, that 
children’s advocates seem to want to have it both ways: young 
people are sufficiently mature for decision making responsibility 
about their bodies, but not for accountability for their criminal 
behavior. Concluding that there is no tidy solution to “Roper’s 
Dilemma,” Dean Rosato nonetheless argues that decision making 
capacity is highly contextual, and thus some minors should be 
permitted to make some health care decisions. The maturity 
determination should be individualized and cannot be based upon 
science alone. That is, medical professionals, rather than courts, 
should assess a particular adolescent’s maturity in most cases, 
taking into account policy goals and context as well as empirical 
research. 
Considering consent in the context of sexual interactions, 
Professor Jennifer Drobac also grapples with the definition of 
maturity, and how recent neuroscience and psychosocial 
advances in this field should impact legal determinations of 
consent. In A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science, 
Teenagers, and the Sting to “the Age of Consent,” she points out 
the inconsistency between formulations of adolescent capacity in 
criminal and civil law even for the same acts: an adult who 
engages in sexual activity with a minor is criminally liable under 
statutory rape laws but may be able to defend against the young 
woman’s claim in a civil case because she “consented” to the 
sexual act.37 Consent is contextual. Accordingly, Professor 
                                                          
36 Rosato, supra note 8. 
37 Drobac, supra note 6, at 95–98 (discussing Doe v. Starbucks, No. 
SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 2009 WL 5183773 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009); 
Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 824 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Table), 2006 WL 240532 (2006) 
and other cases suggesting that statutory rape laws and other criminal 
formulations of consent may not be applicable in the civil context). A similar 
paradox exists between statutory rape laws and criminal laws punishing 
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Drobac does not advocate for one age of consent in all cases. 
She also does not support a bright-line rule of age eighteen for 
the civil context, because recent neuroscience indicates that most 
adolescents are still not reliably able to make mature decisions at 
that age and because it also denies adolescents who mature more 
quickly the benefit of engaging in decision making. Instead, she 
proposes “legal assent,” which requires no threshold level of 
legal capacity and is legally binding on the minor, unless he or 
she chooses to void it subsequently. It is voidable if in the 
minor’s best interest. This consent framework thus both helps 
the minor mature and develop, and allows for the “second 
chances” so essential to still developing young people.  
CONCLUSION 
The lively discussion among the panelists and authors at the 
symposium suggests several conclusions. First, the old dualities 
of consent versus incapacity, and retribution versus 
rehabilitation, do not provide an effective framework for 
assessing the status and role of adolescents today. Instead, we 
need to look for a more nuanced middle ground, which assesses 
the needs and abilities of youth in various contexts. Second, the 
determination of maturity is a complex process, which should 
take into account, but not rely exclusively on, scientific 
developments informing us about neurological and psychosocial 
capacity. Maturity determinations must also take into account 
cultural norms, the context of the right or responsibility at issue, 
and the actors involved in the determination. Third, the law 
continues to grapple with the key question of how to weigh 
adolescents’ need for increasing autonomy and maturation 
experiences with their vulnerability to adult exploitation and 
other harms.  
                                                          
minors for prostitution and related offenses. See Cynthia Godsoe, Finally 
There’s a Safe Harbor, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 10, 2008, at 26. In recent years, a 
number of states have attempted to rectify this disjunction in the law’s 
consideration of adolescents by decriminalizing juveniles charged with 
prostitution. See, e.g., New York Safe Harbor for Exploited Children Act 
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 447-b (McKinney 2010). 
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The next few years will be an exciting time for scholars in 
this field, as the recent line of Supreme Court cases recognizing 
differences between adolescents and adults plays out in the lower 
courts, legislatures, and fields beyond criminal justice. New 
neurological and psychological research will also undoubtedly 
provide us with more, possibly conflicting, information about 
adolescent development. The only certainty is that adolescence 
will remain a period of great change and some turbulence, 
bridging childhood and adulthood. 
 
 
